UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1999/1072
18 October 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 15 OCTOBER 1999 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to convey the attached communication, dated 14 October 1999 (see annex), which I have received from the Permanent Representative of Australia to the United Nations.

I should be grateful if you would bring the communication to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Kofi A. ANNAN

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Annex

Letter dated 14 October 1999 from the Permanent Representative of Australia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

In accordance with Security Council resolution 1264 (1999) of 15 September 1999, I attach the second periodic report on the operations of the International Force, East Timor (INTERFET) (see appendix). I would appreciate your making the report available to the Security Council.

(Signed) Penny WENSLEY

Appendix

Second periodic report to the United Nations on the operations of the International Force, East Timor (INTERFET), 29 September to 12 October 1999

I. INTRODUCTION

1. Since the first periodic report was forwarded to the Security Council, the International Force, East Timor (INTERFET) has continued to deploy multinational forces and conduct patrols further into East Timor. While many East Timorese are now returning to Dili, militia activity remains a significant concern, particularly in the western regions and other outlying areas.

2. Humanitarian relief efforts have shifted away from air drops to the distribution of aid on the ground. This decision was based on the ability of aid agencies to undertake more effective distribution by means of road transport, the improved security in some areas and safety concerns associated with air drops.

II. COOPERATION WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA

3. INTERFET continues to consult with the Government of Indonesia on operations. The Government has advised that it wishes to assist with the repatriation of displaced persons from West Timor to East Timor, and this is being coordinated with INTERFET.

4. Since the first periodic report, Indonesia has continued to withdraw its forces from East Timor. Approximately 1,300 TNI (the Indonesian military) soldiers remain, with TNI-AU (Air Force) and INTERFET sharing security responsibilities at Comoro airfield. INTERFET and TNI now also share joint control of the power station in Dili.

III. RESTORATION OF PEACE AND SECURITY

Deployment activities

5. Members of the multinational force are continuing their deployments to East Timor, following acclimatization and briefings in Townsville and Darwin, Australia. As at 12 October, the total INTERFET deployment numbered around 5,650 personnel. The build up of multinational forces will continue through to the end of October, when the total force will number around 7,500 personnel.

6. To date, INTERFET is represented by contingents from Australia, Brazil, France, Italy, Malaysia, New Zealand, Norway, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America. Forces from Canada, Germany, Ireland and the Republic of Korea will arrive in East Timor over the coming weeks. Negotiations are

continuing with a number of other Member States that have expressed interest in contributing forces to INTERFET.

Restoring security

7. INTERFET has conducted patrols to Com and Los Palos in the east and to Balibo, Batugade and Maliana in the west. Significant forces remain in Baucau and the western regencies. Further moves into outlying areas of East Timor will be undertaken as force numbers build up over the coming weeks.

8. Dili residents continue to demonstrate their increased sense of safety. Despite the very poor state of the infrastructure in Dili, an estimated 64,000 previously displaced persons have now returned to the capital. On 12 October, Dili market reopened after reconstruction by INTERFET. These are tangible measures of the impact of the INTERFET presence.

9. INTERFET continues to enforce an apprehension and detention policy in accordance with its mandate. All detainees are treated fairly and, as part of its accountability efforts, the INTERFET detention centre was inspected by TNI, the Indonesian National Police (POLRI), civilian police of the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) and representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross. All groups expressed their satisfaction with the detention arrangements and the release protocols.

Activities of the militia

10. Since the deployment of multinational forces commenced, the various militia groups have made threats to INTERFET, stating their intention to control the western regencies. During the initial deployment of INTERFET, militia continued to be active in areas outside Dili but did not attempt to engage INTERFET. However, since operations have commenced close to West Timor, INTERFET forces have exchanged fire with armed militia groups on four occasions.

11. On 6 October, INTERFET had cause to fire upon militia in East Timor on two separate occasions in the vicinity of Suai. The first incident involved INTERFET stopping militia vehicles attempting to crash through a road checkpoint. Six militia were wounded, with four flown by helicopter to INTERFET medical facilities in Dili. A total of 116 militia were detained and a number of weapons confiscated.

12. The second incident occurred as an INTERFET vehicle escorting the detainees from the first incident came under fire from a militia ambush. Two INTERFET soldiers were wounded and repatriated to Darwin following treatment in Dili. Two militia were killed in the exchange of fire and their weapons recovered.

13. The third incident occurred on 9 October when a militia group fired upon an INTERFET patrol in the vicinity of Alto Lebos (1.5 km from the border with West Timor). The INTERFET patrol returned fire and one militia member was killed.

14. A similar incident occurred on 10 October, when INTERFET forces were patrolling towards the village of Motaain near the border. Militia, accompanied by TNI forces and POLRI, engaged INTERFET forces. INTERFET troops were fired on

first. They returned fire in self-defence and the militia withdrew from East Timor. Details of casualties have yet to be confirmed but at least one Indonesian person may have been killed. INTERFET swiftly contacted the local POLRI commander. After comparing maps, this officer agreed that INTERFET troops were in East Timor when the incident occurred and that his troops had fired first. However, there was some disagreement over the precise location of the border.

15. These last two incidents illustrate the problems of maintaining security along the border between East Timor and West Timor and the security problems caused by militia crossing from West Timor into East Timor to engage INTERFET forces. INTERFET is urgently seeking discussions with Indonesian authorities to avoid future incidents.

16. The incident at Motaain also illustrates continuing support from elements of the Indonesian security forces for the militias, which is a matter of serious concern.

Contact with other groups

17. The Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor (Falintil) remain armed but they have not undertaken military activity except in self-defence. INTERFET is seeking to disarm all groups in East Timor, other than TNI. In order to maintain peace, INTERFET has instituted an interim working policy of allowing Falintil to retain their weapons only while they remain in designated cantonments. Carriage of weapons outside these areas would result in INTERFET action to disarm them.

Protection and support of UNAMET

18. UNAMET has 58 staff in its compound in Dili. UNAMET has also re-established its offices in Baucau, with INTERFET providing security.

Facilitation of humanitarian assistance operations

19. Humanitarian road convoys have successfully distributed food and emergency supplies to Baucau and Los Palos (30 September), Manatuto and Kaurui (3 October), Viqueque (4 and 5 October) and Liquica (6 October). Unescorted United Nations aid convoys are now permitted on designated roads between Dili, Baucau, Los Palos and Viqueque.

20. Based on advice from INTERFET concerning the security environment in Dili, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has undertaken the repatriation of East Timorese from camps in West Timor. The first flights carrying returning East Timorese commenced on 8 October.

IV. OBSERVATIONS

Management of the INTERFET trust fund

21. Terms of reference for the INTERFET trust fund were agreed upon on 29 September. Portugal has contributed US$ 5 million, Japan has announced a contribution of US$ 100 million and Switzerland has announced a contribution of SwF 500,000. Other States are also considering contributions.

22. The fund will reimburse eligible countries for the costs of their participation. Assistance will be available to contributors once contingents have been called forward by INTERFET.

V. OUTLOOK

Transition to the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor

23. In order to secure a seamless transition to the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), as envisaged in the report of the Secretary-General (S/1999/1024), a Security Council resolution is a matter of some urgency. On current planning, the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) of Indonesia is likely to make its determination on East Timor before the end of October. This underscores the urgency of a Security Council resolution, notwithstanding that the mandate of INTERFET is not affected by the MPR decision and that its authority continues until it is replaced by UNTAET. Given the continuing volatile security situation in East Timor, the successor force to INTERFET should have a robust operational mandate.

Civil administration

24. As indicated in the first periodic report, it is imperative that urgent steps be taken to address the absence of effective civil administration in East Timor and that the civil administration elements of UNTAET be brought forward as much as possible.

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1999/1073
19 October 1999
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

LETTER DATED 19 OCTOBER 1999 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF TOGO TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of the decision defining the new mandate of the Monitoring Group of the Economic Community of West African States in Sierra Leone, signed on 25 August 1999 by the current Chairman of the Authority of Heads of State and Government of the Community (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Roland Y. KPOTSRA

Annex

[Original: English and French]

ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES

DECISION C/AHSG/DEC.1/8/99 REDEFINING THE MANDATE OF ECOMOG IN SIERRA LEONE

THE CHAIRMAN OF THE AUTHORITY OF HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT;

Mindful of Articles 7, 8 and 9 of the Revised Treaty establishing the Authority of Heads of State and Government and defining its composition and functions;

Mindful of Article 8(2) of the Revised Treaty relating to the chairmanship of the Authority of Heads of State and Government of ECOWAS;

Mindful of the Final Communique emanating from the twenty-first Authority of Heads of State and Government meeting, notably paragraph 32 which states that Heads of State and Government have unanimously elected the Republic of Togo as the Chair of ECOWAS for 1998 - 1999;

Mindful of Decision A/DEC. 7/8/97 extending the scope of ECOMOG activity and mandate to cover Sierra Leone;

Mindful of the ECOWAS Peace Plan for Sierra Leone signed in Conakry on 23 October, 1997;

Mindful of the Ceasefire Agreement signed in Lome on 18 May 1999;

Mindful of the Peace Agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front signed in Lome on 7 July 1999;

Considering that the twenty-first session of the Authority of Heads of State and Government had recommended that the Sierra Leonean crisis should be resolved through a combination of dialogue to foster national reconciliation, and the strengthening of ECOMOG;

Considering that, pursuant to consultations held with his peers, the ECOWAS Chairman initiated and organised internal dialogue between the leader of the Revolutionary United Front and his lieutenants;

Considering that negotiations organised between the Sierra Leonean parties by the ECOWAS Chairman led to the signing, in Lome, on 7 July 1999, of a Peace Agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone;

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c) in conjunction with UNOMSIL, disarm all fighters of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF/SL), the civil defence forces (CDF), the ex-Sierra Leone Armed Forces (ex-SLA) and paramilitary groups;

d) establish road blocks and check points to check movement of arms and ammunition and assist in directing refugees and displaced persons;

e) man entry points (land, sea and air) in order to prevent illegal movement of arms and ammunition into or out of the country;

f) conduct confidence patrols to provide free movement of people and easy distribution of relief materials;

g) conduct cordon and search operations to recover hidden arms;

h) provide protection and escort duties to VIPs including Government officials, UN officials and NGO personnel involved in humanitarian relief activities;

i) clearing of land mines and opening of all major roads to commercial activities and normal civilian traffic;

j) deployment of troops in all Disarmament Centres and arms collection sites to enhance disarmament and provide security to encamped ex-combatants;

k) restrict the ex-SLA to the barracks and supervise the return of arms and ammunition to armouries and magazines;

l) establish safe corridors and locations for the settlement of refugees and the distribution of humanitarian relief materials;

m) provide assistance in the screening of combatants;

n) provide security for the weapons and ammunition retrieved during disarmament and demobilisation, as well as the arms depot;

o) assist in the destruction of recovered arms and ammunition;

p) conduct security patrols, guarding of Key-Points (KPs) and Vital-Points (VPs);

q) supervise the withdrawal of mercenaries from Sierra Leone, in collaboration with the Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Commission;

r) supervise technical assistance with regard to the de-mining, dismantling or destruction of all devices and similar weapons.

Article 2

The Force Commander shall report to the Chairman of Authority, through the Executive Secretary on the implementation of the ECOMOG mandate.

Article 3

This Decision shall be published by the Executive Secretariat in the Official Journal of the Community. It shall also be published by each Member State in its National Gazette.

DONE AT LOME THIS 25th DAY OF AUGUST, 1999.

(Signed) H.E. GNASSINGBE EYADEMA
CHAIRMAN
FOR THE AUTHORITY

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1999/1074
19 October 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 19 OCTOBER 1999 FROM THE CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF YUGOSLAVIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

In visiting Kosovo and Metohija, the autonomous province of the Yugoslav constituent Republic of Serbia recently, you set foot for the first time on the soil of the sovereign Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, a Member State and partner of the United Nations in its mission in Kosovo and Metohija.

I have been instructed by my Government to convey its surprise and disappointment that, during your visit, you failed to meet the official representatives of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Mr. Stanimir Vukicevic, Chairman of the Federal Committee for Cooperation with the United Nations Mission, and Mr. Zoran Andjelkovic, President of the Provisional Executive Council of Kosovo and Metohija.

It is unacceptable and incongruous with Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) for the officials of certain countries to refuse to meet, during their visits to Kosovo and Metohija, the representatives of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in Pristina.

It is even harder to understand that the Secretary-General of the United Nations should fail to schedule in his programme a meeting with the Yugoslav official representatives.

That failure has set a negative precedent and runs counter to the said resolution, which insists on respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Albanian extremists, encouraged by that, will pursue their separatist policies even more aggressively. Your decision not to meet the Yugoslav officials is all the more difficult to accept in the light of an open invitation extended to you to visit the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

In conveying the position of my Government on this very important matter, I would appreciate it if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Vladislav JOVANOVIC
Chargé d'affaires a.i.